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A framework for multiple participation in Energy Communities


Ivan Mariuzzo, Bernadette Fina, Stefan Stroemer

IAEE European Conference, Milan, 25 July 2023



RENEWABLE ENERGY COMMUNITIES

- RECs are legal entities grouping end-users of different sectors **sharing** renewable energy produced locally under **geographical constraints**, as same low-voltage or medium-voltage feeder
- **Virtual** aggregation: each participant retains the rights to choose for energy supply conditions and/or leave in case of dissatisfaction.
- RECs can operate **community owned units** and properly allocate benefits amongst the participants




RENEWABLE ENERGY COMMUNITIES


- Energy Communities are entitled to **decide internal purchase/selling prices*** in order to be more competitive with the energy provider, if :
 - Purchase price → lower than provider's
 - Selling price → higher than provider's

- Austria is about to introduce **multiple participation in ECs** within its own national legislation, starting by 2024:
 - «Split» of the participants and units energy exchanges within more than one EC at the same time
 - Multiple sources o which/from which energy can be sold/purchased by participants and units

MULTIPLE ENERGY COMMUNITIES




SETTLEMENT PATTERNS




Rural EC(1):

- 5 SFHs* with 2 prosumers
- 3 and 4 kWp PV for prosumers



City EC(2):

- 3 buildings with 5 MABHs** each
- 27 and 28 kWp PV



Mixed EC(3):

- 1 building with 5 MABHs and 28 kWp PV
- 5 SFHs with 2 prosumer
- 3 and 4 kWp PV for prosumers


*SFH = Single Family Household - 3000-7000 kWh/year. New participant is assumed to belong to this category

**MABH = Multi-Apartment Building Households - 1000-4000 kWh/year

Source: B. Fina, H. Auer, W. Friedl, Profitability of PV sharing in energy communities: Use cases for different settlement patterns, Energy 189 (2019) 116148



METHODOLOGY



PROBLEM FORMULATION

The proposed methodology is formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) optimisation problem implemented in **JuMP** and using **Gurobi** as a solver.

The **Decision variables** are the following:

- ECs' participants power flows - $P_{h,t}^{EP+/-}$, $P_{h,t}^{EC+/-}$
- New participant's power flows - $P_{0,t}^{EP+/-}$, $P_{0,t}^{EC_r+/-}$, x_t
- New participant's ECs allocation - x_r^- , x_r^+ , x_r
- BESS charge/discharge

PROBLEM FORMULATION

The **objective** is to minimize the energy Total Costs (TC) of both all ECs and new participant:

$$\min TC = TC^{EP} + TC^{EC}$$

$$TC^{EP} = \underbrace{\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{h \in H} \rho_{EP}^+ P_{h,t}^{EP+} \Delta t}_{\text{HHs purchasing from supplier}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{h \in H} \rho_{EP}^- P_{h,t}^{EP-} \Delta t}_{\text{HHs selling to supplier}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{r \in R} \rho_{EP}^+ P_{r,t}^S \Delta t}_{\text{Units selling to supplier}}$$

$$TC^{EC} = \underbrace{\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{r \in R} \rho_r^+ (P_{0,t}^{ECr+} + \sum_{h \in H_r} P_{h,t}^{ECr+}) \Delta t}_{\text{HHs purchasing from ECs}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{r \in R} \rho_r^- (P_{0,t}^{ECr-} + \sum_{h \in H_r} P_{h,t}^{ECr-}) \Delta t}_{\text{HHs selling to ECs}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{r \in R} \rho_r^+ P_{r,t}^C \Delta t}_{\text{Units selling to ECs}}$$

A constraint* is added to not worsen initial ECs' energy exchange with the supplier:

$$\sum_{t \in T} \sum_{h \in H_r} P_{h,t}^{EP-} \Delta t + \sum_{t \in T} \sum_{h \in H_r} P_{h,t}^{EP+} \Delta t + \sum_{t \in T} P_{r,t}^S \Delta t \leq E_r^+ + E_r^-$$

*Other constraints that have been used include ECs power balance, BESS management system, etc.

PROBLEM FORMULATION

$$\sum_{r \in R} P_{0,t}^{ECr+/-} + P_{0,t}^{EP+/-} = P_{0,t,M}^{+/-}, \quad \forall t \in T$$

$$0 \leq P_{0,t}^{EP+/-} \leq P_{0,t,M}^{+/-}, \quad \forall t \in T$$

$$x_r P_{0,t,m}^{+/-} \leq P_{0,t}^{ECr+/-} \leq x_r P_{0,t,M}^{+/-}, \quad \forall t \in T, \quad r \in R$$

$$\sum_{r \in R} P_{r,t}^{EC+} + P_t^{EP+} \leq x_t P_{t,max}^+, \quad \forall t \in T$$

$$\sum_{r \in R} P_{r,t}^{EC-} + P_t^{EP-} \leq (1 - x_t) P_{t,max}^-, \quad \forall t \in T$$

New participant's EMS

$$P_{h,t}^{ECr+/-} + P_{h,t}^{EP+/-} = P_{h,t,M}^{+/-}, \quad \forall t \in T, \quad r \in R, \quad h \in H_r$$

$$0 \leq P_{h,t}^{EP+/-} \leq P_{h,t,M}^{+/-}, \quad \forall t \in T, \quad r \in R, \quad h \in H_r$$

$$0 \leq P_{h,t}^{ECr+/-} \leq P_{h,t,M}^{+/-}, \quad \forall t \in T, \quad r \in R, \quad h \in H_r$$

ECs participant's EMS

PROBLEM FORMULATION

$$x_r^+ \beta_{r,m}^+ \leq \beta_r^+ \leq x_r^+ \beta_{r,M}^+, \quad \forall r \in R$$

$$x_r^- \beta_{r,m}^- \leq \beta_r^- \leq x_r^- \beta_{r,M}^-, \quad \forall r \in R$$

$$x_r^- + x_r^+ \geq x_r, \quad \forall r \in R$$

$$x_m \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq x_M$$

$$\triangleright \beta_r^{+/-} = \frac{\sum_{t \in T} P_{0,t}^{ECr^{+/-}}}{\sum_{t \in T} P_{0,t}^{+/-}}, \quad \forall r \in R$$

$$\triangleright \beta_{EP}^{+/-} = \frac{\sum_{t \in T} P_{0,t}^{EP^{+/-}}}{\sum_{t \in T} P_{0,t}^{+/-}}$$

New participant optimal allocation

Participation coefficients

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANALYSIS

Investigate the economic viability* of the following scenarios:

1. Case 1: single EC allocation $\rightarrow 0 \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq 1$
2. Case 2: multiple ECs allocation $\rightarrow 0 \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq 3$
3. Case 3: $\rightarrow 0 \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq 3$ and $\beta_{r,m}^{+/-} \geq 5\%$
4. Case 4: $\rightarrow 0 \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq 3$ and $\beta_{r,m}^{+/-} \geq 10\%$
5. Case 5: $\rightarrow 0 \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq 3$ and $\beta_{r,m}^{+/-} \geq 20\%$
6. Case 6: $\rightarrow 0 \leq \sum_{r \in R} x_r \leq 3$ and $\beta_{r,m}^{+/-} \geq 30\%$

Analysis are repeated changing:



1. The type of the new participant (consumer/prosumer with 4 kWp PV)
2. The local generation** introducing further stand-alone PV and community storage

***Supplier's cost:** purchased at 0.64 €/kWh (with levies, grid charges, 20% VAT and 6% user's fees) and assumed to be sold at 0.25 €/kWh

***ECs' cost:** purchased at 0.38 €/kWh, including grid charges, and assumed to be sold at 0.35 €/kWh

** Additional 20 kWp + 12 kWh BESS in rural EC, 33 kWh BESS in city EC, and 20 kWp + 12 kWh BESS in mixed EC



RESULTS: CONSUMER, BASELINE*



	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
$TC[\text{€}/\text{y}]$	26201.5	26186.8	26186.8	26186.8	26186.8	26201.5
β_{rural}^-	0	0.15	0.13	0.13	0	0
β_{city}^-	0.49	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.30	0.49
β_{mixed}^-	0	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.20	0
β_{EP}^-	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.51
$\sum_{r \in R} x_r$	1	3	3	3	2	1

Mariuzzo Ivan, Bernadette Fina, Stefan Stroemer, Marco Raugi, «Economic Assessment of Multiple Energy Community Participation», Applied Energy, Elsevier, 2023, to be submitted soon



RESULTS: PROSUMER, BASELINE



	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
$TC[\text{€}/\text{y}]$	24715.3	24669.5	24670.2	24682.4	24719.5	24719.5
β_{rural}^+	0.32	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.33
β_{city}^+	0	0.02	0	0	0	0
β_{mixed}^+	0	0.03	0	0	0	0
β_{EP}^+	0.68	0.64	0.68	0.68	0.67	0.67
β_{rural}^-	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
β_{city}^-	0	0.03	0.05	0.10	0	0
β_{mixed}^-	0	0.03	0.05	0	0	0
β_{EP}^-	0.99	0.94	0.90	0.90	1	1
$\sum_{r \in R} x_r$	1	3	3	2	1	1



RESULTS: PROSUMER, ASSETS



	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
$TC [€/y]$	6729.7	6707.4	6715.2	6733.8	6790.3	6790.3
β_{rural}^+	0	0.01	0	0	0	0
β_{city}^+	0	0.01	0.05	0	0	0
β_{mixed}^+	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
β_{EP}^+	0.99	0.98	0.95	1	1	1
β_{rural}^-	0	0.03	0	0	0	0
β_{city}^-	0	0.07	0.05	0	0	0
β_{mixed}^-	0.11	0.04	0.05	0.11	0	0
β_{EP}^-	0.89	0.86	0.90	0.89	1	1
$\sum_{r \in R} x_r$	1	3	2	1	0	0

OUTCOMES

Results

- **Consumer** dependency from provider is reduced up to 50%, but multiple participation only provides benefits as increased flexibility in energy supply.
- **Prosumer** will sell more energy towards provider (>60%) and energy-demanding EC1. MEC incremental savings are up to 6.3% and mainly due to higher flexibility while purchasing from more ECs at lower cost.
- In more self-sufficient communities, **prosumer** revenues will be lower and most of the energy is sold to the provider.
- **Participation coefficients** can be used to reduce number of ECs and avoid small new participant's contribution, but could slightly worsen ECs' units and end-users' savings.
- Results are strongly dependent on energy costs and each ECs participants and units' compositions

THANK YOU FOR THE ATTENTION!

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