

Financing the energy transition


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


Energy transitions are lengthy processes...



Energy transitions require an unprecedented capital mobilisation

Figure 2.22 ▶ Annual average capital investment in the NZE




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Capital investment in energy rises from 2.5% of GDP in recent years to 4.5% by 2030; the majority is spent on electricity generation, networks and electric end-user equipment



The capital mobilisation will be different across technologies and regions



But, who's going to foot the bill?

- Savers/customers
- Taxpayers (this presentation)



Europeans feel they could personally do more to fight climate change


- 93% believe climate change is a serious problem;
- 93% have already taken individual climate actions;
- 87% think it is important that we set ambitious targets for RES;
- 67% think that their national government is not doing enough;
- 88% agree that the green transition should not leave anyone behind;
- 50% agree that the EU is doing enough to ensure that the green transition is fair .



This transition is not a dinner party



Case green, sei d'accordo con
l'obbligo Ue di ristrutturazione



Si
No



Policies for the transition: everything but taxes...

TABLE 2

Best policy for government to take against climate change (%)³⁸

	GERMANY	FRANCE	ITALY	POLAND	CZECH REPUBLIC	SWEDEN	SPAIN	USA	UK
Make public transport free of charge	34	29	22	25	25	24	23	10	27
Allow communities of households to generate their own energy with shared renewable sources, such as local solar or wind	8	17	28	28	16	14	27	22	16
Only give out government funding to businesses that engage in environmentally sustainable activities	14	20	18	9	18	9	15	14	14
Apply a tax on all carbon emissions	12	7	11	13	8	10	15	15	12
Apply a higher tax on all flights people take	12	7	4	3	6	10	3	4	8
Increase the number of nuclear energy plants	4	6	2	9	10	15	4	8	6
Increase the price of meat by adding a special meat tax	7	2	2	3	2	4	3	4	3
The government should not pursue any of these policies	2	2	2	4	3	4	2	10	4



THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

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Original Co-Signatories Include (full list on reverse):

- 4** Former Chairs of the Federal Reserve (All)
 - 27** Nobel Laureate Economists
 - 15** Former Chairs of the Council of Economic Advisers
 - 2** Former Secretaries of the U.S. Department of Treasury
-

Economists' Statement on Carbon Dividends



The case for carbon pricing (2)

pros

- increase energy prices (efficiency);
- polluter pay principle;
- revenue-recycling mechanisms for ensuring fairness;
- raise new resources;

cons

- difficult to identify the “right” Q (cap-and-trade) or P (carbon tax);
- cumbersome application (e.g. ETS for transportation or space heating);
- social rejection.



Economists' most preferred, while policymakers have shown a tepid response

KEY STATISTICS ON REGIONAL, NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL CARBON PRICING INITIATIVE(S)


73 Carbon Pricing initiatives implemented

39 National Jurisdictions are covered by the initiatives selected

33 Subnational Jurisdictions are covered by the initiatives selected

In 2023, these initiatives would cover
11.66 GtCO₂e, representing **23%** of
global GHG emissions

Summary map of regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives




- ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation
- Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation
- ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled
- ETS or carbon tax under consideration
- Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration
- ETS implemented or scheduled, ETS or carbon tax under consideration




Carbon taxes are usually regressive...as RES funding using the electricity bill


1. China (\$50 carbon tax)




2. United States (\$75 carbon tax)



3. Turkey (\$50 carbon tax)



4. Argentina (\$50 carbon tax)



■ Road fuels
 ■ Electricity
 ■ Natural Gas
 ■ Other & indirect
 ■ Cash transfers
 ■ Labor tax reduction
 ◇ Net change

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A case for a carbon tax in Italy




Figure 9: Total household expenditure under different carbon taxes, by expenditure quintile

Support for climate policies hinges on...

1. Effectiveness in reducing emissions (**effectiveness** concern)
2. Distributional impacts on lower-income households (**inequality** concern)
3. Impact on the respondents' household (**self-interest**)

Also, in the case of carbon taxes (Dechezlepretre et al., 2023):

- people **overestimate** the impact on their budget, **underestimate** the benefits;
- assume it's **regressive** and **not effective**;
- the more **politically biased**, the more **overestimating** the losses ;
- incorporating changing values and political incentives in a dynamic setting models show the failure of the “political Coase” (Besley and Persson, 2023).



How to make carbon pricing accepted?

- Revenue recycling matters: with targeted redistribution, support rises (Dechezlepretre et al. , 2023)
- Effective and inclusive communication (Douanne et Fabre, 2022; Parry et al. 2022; Besley and Persson, 2023);
- However, changing people's beliefs is hard and results are not sizable
- In general, not leaving anyone behind: perceived fairness matter



Conclusions

- Financing this energy transition will require **sizable** resources, from the private and public sectors;
- **Support** for climate policies is based on public **perceptions of effectiveness, fairness and self-interest**;
- Among all climate policies, carbon pricing is the **most advocated by economists**, one of **the least preferred by policymakers**;
- effectiveness and fairness can (must?) go hand in hand
- what the Implications for firms' competitiveness, trade...(e.g. IRA vs. CBAM/CSDDD vs. chinese subsidies)



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Thank you

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