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# Local Energy Communities: valuing flexibility for power market design and grid investment planning

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# Context

## ❑ French agreements for carbon neutrality

Increase renewables (33% of final consumption in 2030) and electrifying more usages (mobility, industry).

## ❑ Market Challenges

- Centralized markets: security of electricity supply. Issue to capture priority to local generation (integrate DR/ RES).
- Decentralized markets: issue to capture network constraints: new profiles + prosumers + DSO.

## ❑ Current routines on flexibility. Perspectives.

Flexibility centrally dispatched in France.

French TSO scenarios by 2050: DR 28 - 68 GW ( ~ 5 times more than today).

# Motivation

## □ Local energy market as solution to DR, local RES, but remaining issues:

- Emerging, experimental, too complex.
- Few long-term signals to actors.
- EC application is not ready yet (peer-to-peer?)
- EC impacts on the whole energy system remains open.

➤ **Our topic** : Valuing flexibility for energy markets and design for future local markets.

# Literature review. Contributions

## 1) Demand Response (Ponnaganti et al. 2023 , Dranka et al. 2022)

Price-based, incentive-based signals; energy efficiency VS DR (industry, organisation transformation).

➤ Contribution : distinction between **central and local flexibility** supply.

## 2) Market design (Ahlqvist et al 2022, Finon et al 2022) + **flexibility markets** (Vagropoulos et al. 2022, Pichoud et al 2021)

Centralized / decentralized markets. Coordination DSO (congestion, voltage control, flexibility) - TSO (balancing).


➤ Contribution: EC solutions with **upscaling method** and priority to **local power**.

## 3) Grid planning (González et al. 2022, Umoh et al. 2023) + **grid pricing** (Gautier et al. 2021, Clastres et al. 2019)

Avoided peaking capacity. Heterogeneous clients. Efficiency and equity of dynamic pricing.

➤ Contribution : index performance of flexibility = (opportunity cost) avoided **grid reinforcement**.


# Flexibility and energy actors representation



→ Buy energy    → Buy flex    → Sell flex    → Sell energy

# Distribution grid basis for modeling EC and flexibility

1km < lenght < 50 km



- MV/LV transformers    ○○ substation    X node
- HV 63/90 kV    —————    ➔ Market supply to consumers
- MV 20 kV    —————    ➔ Direct local supply to consumers
- LV 230 V    —————

MV Consumer      LV Consumer

# Technical concepts: energy community + flexibility markets

## Energy community assumptions


- Still connected to the grid
- Consumers supplied with local power generation OR
- Consumers with self-consumption (invest in their own solar panels OR/AND are flexible = prosumers)
- Model Assumption : preference for local RES and energy loss minimisation

## Local flexibility markets definition

Any load variation related to historical profile, due to:

- Cable constraints
- Congestion

# Grid and power market representation





# Methodology: framework and data

Cable constraints:

$gen^{MV} > KLW2$  ;  $gen^{MV} > KLI2$ ;  $gen^{MV} > kl1$  , so curtailment.  
 $D^{MV} > KLW2$  ;  $D^{MV} > KLI2$ ;  $D^{MV} > kl1$  , so negative flexibility.

Scenario	Capacity of electrical network, MW	Residential Building LV Demand , MW	Industrial Building MV Demand , MW	LV Solar capacity , MW	MV Solar capacity , MW
2022	KNI : 9 KNW : 80 KLI2 : 3 KLW2 : 8 KLI3 : 4 KLW3 : 9 kl1 : 1	0.0028	21	0.84	8.4

Case study: one substation HV/MV made of the available **injection capacity** KNI and **withdrawal capacity** KNS. **41 residential LV consumers, 36 kVA connected to 4 MV/LV transformers**; 1 industrial consumer connected to **MV concerned, solar PV power plants, PV 1 MWp and 10 MWp.**

# Methodology : problem formulation

## Objective function: welfare maximization

$$\max_{FP_h^{LV}, FN_h^{LV}, FP_h^{MV}, FN_h^{MV}} obj = pmv_h^{LV} + plv_h^{LV} + pmv_h^{MV} + plv_h^{MV}$$

- Priority to local generation, electricity loss minimization.

## Equilibrium constraint: demand = supply

$$D_h^{LV} - FP_h^{LV} - FN_h^{LV} = m_h^{LV} + pmv_h^{LV} + plv_h^{LV}$$

$$D_h^{MV} - FP_h^{MV} - FN_h^{MV} = m_h^{MV} + pmv_h^{MV} + plv_h^{MV}$$

- Flexibility adjusts the balance (positive /negative).

## Curtailement accounting

$$curt_h^{LV} = potpv_h^{LV} * K_h^{LV} - plv_h^{LV} - plv_h^{MV}$$

$$curt_h^{MV} = potpv_h^{MV} * K_h^{MV} - pmv_h^{LV} - pmv_h^{MV}$$

# Constraints

## Demand Response postponement over one day

$$\sum_{h=1}^{24} FP_h^{LV} = \sum_{h=1}^{24} FN_h^{LV}$$

$$\sum_{h=1}^{24} FP_h^{MV} = \sum_{h=1}^{24} FN_h^{MV}$$

## Demand Response bounds

$$\sum_{h=1}^{8760} FP_h^{LV} \leq \alpha * D_h^{LV}$$

$$\sum_{h=1}^{8760} FN_h^{LV} \leq \alpha * D_h^{LV}$$

$$\sum_{h=1}^{8760} FP_h^{MV} \leq \alpha * D_h^{MV}$$

$$\sum_{h=1}^{8760} FN_h^{MV} \leq \alpha * D_h^{MV}$$

## Grid constraints

$$m_h^{MV} \leq KNS$$

$$m_h^{LV} \leq KNS$$

$$pmv_h^{MV} \leq KLI2$$

$$pmv_h^{MV} \leq K LW2$$

$$pmv_h^{LV} \leq KLI2$$

$$pmv_h^{LV} \leq K LW2$$

$$pmv_h^{LV} \leq kl1$$

$$plv_h^{MV} \leq kl1$$

$$plv_h^{MV} \leq KLI2$$

$$plv_h^{MV} \leq K LW2$$

$$plv_h^{LV} \leq kl1$$

# Results: LV consumption in the reference scenario (2022)

## Test 1: No flexibility market

- Low local consumption due to cable constraint (**16% of consumption**).

## Test 2: Flexibility market (no target, no incentive)

- Decrease in local consumption (**13 points**) due to MV consumer flexibility.

## Test 3: Flexibility market with incentives to reach a target (imposed flexibility target)

- Consumption Test 3 = Test 1, due to load shifting.
- Consumption Test 3 requires the same installed capacity (**no peaking avoided**).

Scenario 2022			
Demand 2022 & PV			
	No flexibility	Free flexibility	Imposed flexibility
		Flex 5%	Flex 5%
<b>LV Consumption, kWh</b>	<b>9 101</b>	<b>9 012</b>	<b>9 101</b>
MV local; Peak time High Season	1 160	209	1 160
MV local; Off-peak time High Season	129	9	129
MV local; Peak time Low Season	82	26	82
MV local; Off-peak time Low Season	-	-	-
LV local; Peak time High Season	72	7	72
LV local; Off-peak time High Season	2	-	2
LV local; Peak time Low Season	10	2	10
LV local; Off-peak time Low Season	-	-	-
<i>Total LV local</i>	<u>1 455</u>	<u>253</u>	<u>1 455</u>
Market; Peak time High Season	3 565	4 512	3 565
Market; Off-peak time High Season	2 799	2 908	2 799
Market; Peak time Low Season	742	798	742
Market; Off-peak time Low Season	540	540	540
<i>Total LV market</i>	<u>7 646</u>	<u>8 759</u>	<u>7 646</u>

# MV consumption in the reference scenario (2022)

## Test 1 and test 3

- Same **qualitative results** as in LV consumption.

## Test 2

- Increase in MV consumption with respect to LV consumption due to increase in PV generation (1 point).

Scenario 2022			
Demand 2022 & PV			
	No flexibility	Free flexibility	Imposed flexibility
		Flex 5%	Flex 5%
<b>MV Consumption, MWh</b>	<b>81 500</b>	<b>82 478</b>	<b>81 500</b>
<i>MV local ; Peak time High Season</i>	11 467	12 469	11 467
MV local ; Off-peak time High Season	634	754	634
MV local ; Peak time Low Season	459	515	459
MV local ; Off-peak time Low Season	-	-	-
LV local ; Peak time High Season	1 210	1 275	1 210
LV local ; Off-peak time High Season	75	76	75
LV local ; Peak time Low Season	44	52	44
LV local ; Off-peak time Low Season	-	-	-
<i>Total MV local</i>	<u>13 889</u>	<u>15 143</u>	<u>13 889</u>
Market; Peak time High Season	37 388	37 184	37 388
Market; Off-peak time High Season	22 797	22 742	22 797
Market; Peak time Low Season	4 893	4 875	4 893
Market; Off-peak time Low Season	2 533	2 533	2 533
<i>Total MV market</i>	<u>67 611</u>	<u>67 335</u>	<u>67 611</u>

# Flexibility

Scenario 2022			
Demand 2022 & PV			
	No flexibility	Free flexibility	Imposed flexibility
		Flex 5%	Flex 5%
Flexibility			
LV positive, kWh	-	5	455
LV negative, kWh	-	94	455
MV positive, MWh	-	52	4 077
MV negative, MWh	-	276	4 077

## Test 2

- Positive flexibility supply **is lower than** negative flexibility due to preference for local generation

## Test 3 (with targets on all flexibility types)

- Reproducing of total postponment

# PV generation

Scenario 2022			
Demand 2022 & PV			
	No flexibility	Free flexibility	Imposed flexibility
		Flex 5%	Flex 5%
<b>Local Power</b>			
<b>MV local power</b>			
Capacity , MW	10	10	10
Generation, MWh	13 932	13 983	13 932
Curtailment, MWh	194	143	194
<b>LV local power</b>			
Capacity , MW	1	1	1
Generation, MWh	1 413	1 413	1 413
Curtailment, MWh	-	-	-

- Free market flexibility allows to generate more MV local power (**1 point**): avoided **curtailment is higher** than in other markets.
- There is no curtailment in LV local power due to no congestion.

# Bill avoided by prosumers and grid operator

Scenario 2022			
Demand 2022 & PV			
	No flexibility	Free flexibility	Imposed flexibility
		Flex 5%	Flex 5%
<b>Bill Avoided, €</b>			
<b>Avoided Grid reinforcement cost</b>	58 329 000	42 870 000	58 329 000
LV Consumer bill variation	61 596	18 150	61 596

- With imposed flexibility, grid operator avoided reinforcement cost as well as with no flexibility target. In free flexibility market, we find **the grid operator missing money due to curtailment avoided**.
- With imposed flexibility market, the variation of **the LV consumer bill is higher than in a free flexibility market**. How about others consumers who are outside of this community?

- Grid hypothesis : average cost of solar insertion on the grid = **300k€/MW** (Pichoud et al., 2021)
- LV consumers hypothesis : same taxes for consumer and prosumer



# Sensitivity test with 10 %, 20% flexibility

- Avoided curtailment **increase with flexibility rate** in free flexibility market.
- Increase in local production **does not mean increase in consumption.**
- Flexibility from 5 to 10 % in free flexibility market allow to avoid **the double of generation curtailment.**

Scenario 2022			
Demand 2022 & PV			
	Free flexibility		Imposed flexibility
	Flex 10%	Flex 20%	Flex 5%
<b>LV Consumption, kWh</b>	8 917	8 751	9 101
<i>Total LV local</i>	251	221	1 455
Total LV market	8 666	8 530	7 646
<b>MV Consumption, MWh</b>	82 146	81 421	81 500
Total MV local	15 186	15 272	13 889
Total MV market	66 960	66 149	67 611
<b>Flexibility</b>			
LV positive, kWh	10	10	455
LV negative, kWh	195	360	455
<i>MV positive, MWh</i>	92	149	4 077
MV negative, MWh	650	1 461	4 077
<b>Local Power</b>			
<b>MV local power</b>			
Capacity , MW	10	10	10
Generation, MWh	14 024	14 080	13 932
Curtailment, MWh	102	46	194
<b>LV local power</b>			
Capacity , MW	1	1	1
Generation, MWh	1 413	1 413	1 413
Curtailment, MWh	-		-

# Concluding remarks

## **Cable sizing**

- Local flexibility alone cannot increase PV local consumption due to local grid congestion.

## **Size of the flexibility market**

- Need to study the local congestion events.

## **Take away message:**

- No need for incentive for integrating flexibility when preference for local PV OR market price  $>$  local PV
- Market for flexibility (with a price) necessary for larger shares than 5% (too narrow market) ....
- What is the level of curtailment socially, privately accepted?

Thank you for your attention!

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